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LIBERAL LEGAL NORMS MEET
COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY
John D. Ciorciari*
By Mark Osiel. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 2009. Pp. xviii, 257. £50.
MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2008, a Cambodian survivor confronted a Khmer Rouge leader for the first time at a U.N.-backed tribunal in Phnom Penh. Facing Pol
Pot's infamous deputy, Nuon Chea, she recounted her parents' untimely
deaths and her brutal imprisonment at age seven, when she was shackled
beside her four-year-old brother. Nuon Chea has denied responsibility for
these and other atrocities during the Khmer Rouge reign of terror in the
late 1970s, but the victim asked plaintively, "If Nuon Chea claimed he was
not responsible, who was then for the loss of my parents and other victims' loved ones?"'
That plea drove to the heart of the challenge of accounting for mass
atrocity. From the gas chambers at Auschwitz to the dust-swept plains of
Darfur, survivors are left scouring for answers. What happened? How can
the crimes be explained? Who should be blamed? What can help victims
heal? How can future abuses be prevented? These questions follow any
crime but pose particular problems after mass atrocities, which invariably
involve numerous perpetrators acting through complex organizations.
International criminal law ("ICL") tends to focus on the same question
asked by the Cambodian survivor above: who was ultimately most responsible? Focusing on the culpability of senior leaders has powerful appeal. It
resonates with a natural human tendency to personify misdeeds and identify a primary locus for moral blame. It also serves political ends by
putting a face on mass crimes, decapitating the old regime, and leaving
room for reconciliation at lower levels. But what happens when smoking
guns do not point clearly toward high-ranking officials? And how can the
law address the fact that most atrocities are committed by lower-level
functionaries in the field? It is seldom possible to put all-or even mostof the culprits of mass atrocities on trial. What legal doctrines and policy
*
Assistant Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. The
author is grateful to Carrie Booth Walling and Monica Hakimi for their comments on previous
drafts.
1. Ker Munthit, Cambodian Genocide Victim Confronts Ex Khmer Rouge Leader, THE
IRRAWADDY, Feb. 9, 2008, availableat http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art-id=10233 (quoting
civil party Theary Seng from a hearing of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia).
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practices best help a society achieve the delicately intertwined goals of
justice, peace, and reconciliation?
Mark Osiel' tackles these vexing questions in Making Sense of Mass
Atrocity. Osiel is a seasoned and accomplished analyst of ICL. In this latest work, the fifth in a series of books dealing with responses to mass
atrocity,' he compels readers to reflect on how such crimes really happen,
how the law currently addresses them, and how it should. He offers trenchant critiques of ICL and proposes significant doctrinal and policy
reforms, focusing on how legal rules and practices can incentivize relevant
actors to prevent or deal with such abuses. His book may rankle some of
ICL's true believers, but it offers an important and constructive contribution to a field that can sometimes use a bit more introspection.
This Review begins by introducing the problem Osiel seeks to address-namely, the challenge of responding to collective atrocities. In Part
II, it assesses his arguments on how to reform relevant legal doctrines. Part
III examines his claims regarding the roles of amnesty and prosecution as
national and international actors seek to promote diverse interests in retribution, deterrence, and reconciliation. Finally, Part IV evaluates his
boldest proposal-to supplement existing practices by imposing collective
civil sanctions on military officers in certain circumstances.
I. THE

DILEMMA: INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGS

At its core, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity is an effort to relieve ten-

sion between the basic tenets of legal liberalism and the grisly social
reality of how mass crimes are committed. Modern ICL sprouted from the
seeds of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and rests on a foundation of
broadly "liberal" principles that emphasize individual rights and responsibilities. Its signal achievement has been to move beyond the law's
traditional remedy of imposing collective civil penalties against states,
"pierce the sovereign veil," and hold individuals responsible for their
crimes. There is much to be said for a focus on accountability. By challenging impunity, ICL helps develop and reinforce basic human rights
norms. The threat of criminal prosecution gives would-be offenders reason
to think twice before orchestrating mass abuses. Criminal trials also pro2.

Professor of Law, Aliber Family Chair, University of Iowa College of Law.

Previous books include MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE
LAW (1997); MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAW OF
WAR (1999); MARK J. OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR (2001); and MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY:
TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR (2009). Osiel has also published numerous law review
articles and commentaries on related subjects.
3.

4. The independent deterrent effect of international criminal justice is difficult to measure,
and empirical studies are lacking. However, even most despots doubtlessly reflect before enacting
brutal policies, giving ICL an opportunity to shape their cost-benefit calculi. See Payam Akhavan,

Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism
with Political Realism, 31 HuM. RTS. Q. 624 (2009) [hereinafter Akhavan, Disincentive to Peace?];
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vide at least some victims with a sense of justice and empowerment and
may help facilitate personal healing as well.'
Prioritizing individual culpability can be problematic, however, if the
pendulum swings too far. Leaders cannot commit mass atrocities alone.
Osiel thus identifies a basic conundrum: "Criminal law sees a world of separate persons, whereas mass atrocity entails collective behavior" (p. x). He
warns that "[w]ith its focus on discrete deeds and isolated intentions, legal
analysis risks missing the collaborative character of genocidal massacre, the
vast extent of unintended consequences, and the ways in which 'the whole'
conflagration is often quite different from the sum of its parts" (p. 2).
Tension certainly does exist. As Mark Drumbl and others have noted, it
is awkward to "shoehorn collective agency into the framework of individual
guilt."6 Organizational behavior and systemic forces are essential to understanding past atrocities and preventing future ones, but criminal trials tend to
downplay these dynamics. Prosecutors have incentives to treat complex collectives as bundles of discrete, autonomous actors rather than organic
wholes. Focusing on structure rather than agency is dangerous when seeking
convictions and assigning blame; it risks presenting defendants as fungible
cogs in an impersonal machine. Genocidal killers could go free, and support
for tribunals could quickly evaporate.
The fact that prosecutors can usually target only a fraction of suspects
exacerbates the problem. They target senior figures when possible, but convicting those leaders is often difficult. Smoking-gun evidence rarely links
them directly to crimes carried out by their subordinates. To avoid letting
high-ranking criminals off the hook, prosecutors and judges have powerful
incentives to devise new doctrines that stretch the boundaries of individual
responsibility. In such circumstances, ICL risks reaching beyond the pale of
the basic principle of culpability and breaching individual rights in an effort
to defend them. Osiel argues that the law "seems to find itself impaled on
the horns of this dilemma" (p. 3). Without "doctrinal ingenuities, criminal
law might never fully reach mass atrocity's masterminds," he writes. "Yet, if
liberal legality achieves this laudable goal only by compromising its first
principles, then in the process it has surely lost its moral bearings, even sacrificed its soul" (p. 118).
Even successful prosecutions of leaders are only a partial response to
widespread terror. Most low-level offenders escape judgment, and the threat
or occurrence of trials does not ensure that they will lay down their arms,
reconcile with erstwhile adversaries, and forego future abuses. Osiel rightly
argues that a range of policy options deserves consideration in responding to
Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can InternationalCriminal Justice Prevent FutureAtrocities?,
95 Am. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001). For a competing view, see Helena Cobban, InternationalCourts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-April 2006, at 22, 26 (arguing that ICL has limited deterrent capability due to the
impassioned or irrational nature of many mass human rights abusers).
5.

See, e.g., JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 133, 155, 183 (1997); MAR-

THA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND

MASS VIOLENCE 66-74, 88-89 (1998).
6.

MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2007).
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collective crimes. He develops a number of doctrinal and policy reforms,
taking an "economic vantage point" (p. 11) that prioritizes giving key actors
incentives to prevent and punish gross human rights violations.
II.

REFORMING LEGAL DOCTRINES

The first set of challenges is doctrinal. Fighting impunity requires holding leaders accountable. A leader may be held liable as a principal for
perpetrating, planning, or ordering a crime or as an accessory for aiding and
abetting.7 However, high-ranking criminals rarely pull the trigger; most
physical acts of mass atrocity are committed by foot soldiers and functionaries. Moreover, leaders usually try to avoid leaving evidence of specific
orders, concrete plans, or even clear chains of command. In such cases,
prosecutors must look to other forms of responsibility. Since the late 1990s,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")and to a lesser extent, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR")-have refined or expanded legal doctrines to connect leaders to
far-flung atrocities. They have relied primarily on the concepts of joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") and superior responsibility.
JCE is based on the "common purpose doctrine" that emerged from the
post-World War II trials of Nazi defendants engaged in organized murder.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber set forth the three basic forms of the doctrine
in the 1999 Tadid judgment." The first, "basic" form ("JCE-I") resembles the
doctrine of conspiracy. It applies when a defendant belongs to a group possessing a common criminal purpose and renders the defendant liable for
intended crimes of the group, even if the defendant was not the physical
perpetrator.' The second, "systemic" form ("JCE-II") is similar. It renders a
defendant liable for crimes committed by other members of a concentration
camp or similar facility if they shared a common criminal purpose and car-

7. These modes of liability are related to the notions of conspiracy and complicity. See
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (amended 1998 and 2000) (imposing responsibility on individuals who
"planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime"). The statutes of other contemporary tribunals contain similar
provisions. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.
8, 1994); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"), art. 6, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1315
(Aug. 14, 2000); Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
("ECCC") for the prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
art. 29 (Act. No. NSIRKM/0801/12).
8. The Tadidjudgment referred to these categories as variants of liability under the common
purpose doctrine. The ICTY Appeals Chamber later adopted the term "joint criminal enterprise." See
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, I 1 et seq. (Mar.
19,2004).
9. Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, [f[196, 220 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadid
Appeals Judgment]. The Almelo Trial was one precedent; three Germans intended to kill a British
soldier and were convicted as co-perpetrators although they performed different roles. Trial of Otto
Sandrock and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Almelo, Holland,
Nov. 24-26, 1945, 1 U.N. War Crimes Commission ("UNWCC"), Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 35.
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ried out complementary functions.'o The third, "extended" form ("JCE-IHl")
was the most groundbreaking and controversial. It allows a court to find a
defendant guilty for a crime by another group member that "while outside of
the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the effecting of that common purpose."" JCE-III is based on the notion
that people who engage in exceptionally dangerous activities should bear the
risk of foreseeable adverse consequences.
The doctrine of superior responsibility offers an alternative path to
conviction. It grew out of the ancient principle of command responsibility in
wartime. In its modern embodiment, it subjects both civilian and military
leaders to criminal liability for a failure to punish or prevent crimes by
subordinates when under a duty to do so. The ICTY's 1998 eelebi6i judgment set forth the three core elements of the contemporary doctrine. The
defendant must have possessed "effective control" over subordinates; knew
or had reason to know of crimes they committed or would commit; and
nevertheless failed to take appropriate remedial action."
Osiel argues that under ICTY jurisprudence, it is "too easy" to convict
high-ranking criminals under JCE and "too difficult" under superior
responsibility (p. 24). He proposes "to steer the law safely between these twin
perils" (p. 30) by curtailing JCE and broadening the bounds of superior
responsibility. He recommends broadening the latter by infusing it with a
concept of managerial control that is typically associated with the civil law
doctrines of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration. These doctrineswhich are expressly included in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC")-apply when an individual commits a crime "jointly
with another" or "through another" person. 14 They differ from JCE by
focusing less on implied criminal agreement and more on the types of
organizational behavior and association that should render group members
responsible for one another's offenses. Osiel regards this shift of focus as
more consistent with liberal norms and more reflective of how collective
atrocities occur.

10. Tadid Appeals Judgment, supra note 9, at 203. This followed a series of cases decided
by British and American courts in Germany after the Second World War, including the Dachau
Concentration Camp and Belsen cases. See, e.g., Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine
others, General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, Nov. 15Dec. 13, 1945, 11 UNWCC, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 5; Trial of Josef Kramer and 44
others, British Military Court, Luneberg, Germany, Sept. 17-Nov. 17, 1945, 2 UNWCC, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1.
11.
For example, Tadi6 was part of an armed group that raided a Bosnian village as part of an
ethnic cleansing campaign. Although evidence did not prove that he perpetrated killings, Tadid was
convicted for the murder of five Muslims because he participated in a criminal enterprise in which
such crimes were foreseeable. Tadid Appeals Judgment, supra note 9, at 1 204, 373.
12.

See Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, 38 (Nov. 16, 2005).

13.

Prosecutor v. Delali6, IT-96-21-T, Judgment,

346 (Nov. 16, 1998).

14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute], arts. 25(3)(a), (d).
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A. Taming JCE

Joint criminal enterprise quickly emerged as the ICTY prosecutors' preferred vehicle for linking mid-level or senior officials to diffuse and
dispersed offenses in the field." However, to many critics, JCE threatens to
violate the basic principle of criminal law that a defendant must have had
culpable knowledge or intent to be convicted of an offense.' The concept of
an "enterprise" is vague, 7 as are the notions of common criminal plans or
the "natural and foreseeable consequences" that flow from it. This leaves
defendants potentially liable for a vast range of crimes that they did not
commit, intend, or even know about. Osiel is justifiably concerned about the
doctrine's "elasticity" (p. 66) and "dangerously illiberal tendencies" (p. 92).
As he notes, similar doctrines have been struck down in most legal systems." The ICTY has fueled these concerns by allowing JCE's reach to
expand dramatically since Tadid. Defendants have been convicted for atrocities committed by far-away perpetrators who had no proven contact with the
defendant and no common membership in a hierarchical organization. 9
Osiel concludes that the ICTY's brand of JCE is "so broad a notion that it
requires enormous self-restraint by prosecutors ever to be defensible in practice" (p. 73).
He also finds it problematic that JCE can apply similarly to enterprise
members of all ranks. He faults the doctrine's "utter indifference to power
when determining liability" (p. 78) and argues that the law cannot address
the reality of collective crimes without focusing on power relations, organizational dynamics, and those who were most responsible. Osiel therefore
15. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of InternationalCriminal Law, 93 CALIF.
L. REV. 75, 107 (2005). The ICTR has used the doctrine more sparingly, instead trying numerous
defendants for conspiracy to commit genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
art. 3 (Dec. 9, 1948).
16. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 15, at 134-46; GIDEON BOAS ET AL., FORMS OF
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 106 (2007); JOHN LAUGHLAND, TRAVESTY:
THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILO§EVId AND THE CORRUPTION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 116-23
(2007); Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 69, 78-88 (2007).
17. International courts have provided little guidance. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a
criminal "enterprise" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act
merely to require "an ongoing organization, formal or informal," Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
2237, 2243 (2009), that exists "separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages."
Id. at 2249 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583
(1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Many U.S. states apply the controversial Pinkerton doctrine, which holds individuals
responsible for foreseeable crimes by co-conspirators. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1946). However, the Model Penal Code rejects this principle. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06 (1962); Edward M. Wise, RICO and its Analogues: Some Comparative Considerations, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 303, 312 (2000) (noting that no civil law system applies such liability).
19.

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstid, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, U] 610-45 (Aug. 2, 2001). For

additional examples, see STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 144-45 & nn.20-21 (2009).
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advocates narrowing JCE and applying it less often. He suggests that "it is
possible to construe enterprise participation as a form of complicity" (p. 89),
which "might not be an entirely bad idea" (p. 90). This would trim the scope
of JCE, because complicity requires proving that the defendant knew about
and contributed substantially to the crime. It would also reduce JCE's appeal, because even high-level criminals would be convicted as accomplices,
not principals.
The ICC appears to be headed in that direction. The Rome Statute does
not refer to enterprises specifically but imposes liability when a defendant
"contributes to the commission ... of ... a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose ... [to further] the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group." 20 In the 2007 Lubanga case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber described this provision as "closely akin" to JCE but as a "residual form
of accessory liability" that applies when a defendant's conduct does not fit
other established categories such as ordering, aiding, or abetting.2" Instead of
applying JCE, the ICC applied the co-perpetration doctrine as a form of
principal liability. However, it held that co-perpetration requires that the22
defendant's participation be "essential" to the commission of the crime.
This raises a major evidentiary hurdle and makes co-perpetration less appealing to prosecutors than JCE, and less useful as a mechanism for holding
leaders accountable.
Decisions of hybrid tribunals reflect continued contestation about the
proper scope of JCE. Like the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has
applied an expansive version of the doctrine.23 By contrast, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") recently curtailed the
doctrine's application. In a stinging rebuke to the ICTY, it ruled that JCE-III
was not a part of customary international law when the Khmers Rouges
(no crime
were in power and that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege
24
without law) required excluding JCE-III from the proceedings.
20.

Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 25(3)(d).

21.
charges,

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of

23.

See Jennifer Easterday, ObscuringJoint Criminal Enterprise Liability: The Conviction of

TJ 335-37 (Jan. 29, 2007).
22. Id. fi[ 342-47.

Augustine Gbao by the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 3 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. PUBLiCiST 36, 39-42

(2009).
24. In re the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Decision on the Appeals Against the CoInvestigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) (May 20, 2010) [hereinafter ECCC
PTC decision]. The Tadid court relied on post-World War II cases and various domestic practices to
argue that JCE-HI was a part of customary international law. The ICTY Appeals Chamber cited the
Borkum Island and Essen Lynching cases as precedents. Tadi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 9,
205-12 (citing United States v. Goebell ("Borkum Island"), Case No. 12-489, Deputy Judge
Advocate's Office, 7708 War Crimes Group, European Command, Aug. 1, 1947, U.S. Nat'1 Archives Microfilm Publications, and Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others ("Essen Lynching"), British
Mil. Ct. for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, Germany, Dec. 18-19, 21-22, 1945, 1 UNWCC, Law
Reports of Trials of War Criminals 88-91). However, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTC") found
these precedents unconvincing, because despite fact patterns germane to JCE-WI, neither court issued specific findings on the issue of common criminal plans. The PTC also found that national
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Osiel's basic point is correct-JCE should be applied more narrowly
than it has been at the ICTY to preserve ICL's credibility and adherence to
foundational liberal principles. However, it is important to disaggregate the
doctrine. The extended mode is highly problematic and requires much more
specific definitions of group membership and mens rea to merit future use,
even as a form of accessory liability. JCE-I is comparatively safe and worth
retaining as a form of principal liability. The systemic form of JCE lies in
between. It deserves continued application, but only if courts impose clearer
standards on what constitutes a repressive system and qualifies as a common
criminal purpose giving rise to mens rea. If these conditions are met, JCE-II
can be a useful tool in advancing accountability for institutionalized collective crimes.
B. Expanding SuperiorResponsibility

In addition to limiting JCE, Osiel suggests reducing reliance on it by
broadening superior responsibility. Osiel argues that under current law, superior responsibility fails to capture enough culpable conduct and errs by
treating leaders as passive participants in mass crimes. He also faults the
ICTY for interpreting the doctrine too narrowly. For example, in the 2008
Ori6 case, the ICTY declined to convict a superior for failing to punish
crimes committed by subordinates before the establishment of a superiorsubordinate relationship.25 In this and other cases, prosecutors have found
the doctrine difficult to deploy effectively. Osiel recommends repairing the
doctrine by easing the control requirement and effectively reducing the
standard of mens rea.
1. Easing the Control Requirement

The ICTY has defined "effective control" to mean the material ability to
26
prevent, stop, or punish offenses by subordinates. In practice, the prosecutor has found it difficult to satisfy this requirement given the murky
distinctions between de facto and de jure authority, the ebb and flow of a
leader's influence across individual subordinates over time, and crisscrossing chains of command. To Osiel, this "largely explain[s] why superior
responsibility has fallen into such disfavor at the ICTY" (p. 39). He argues
that the doctrine is too rigid to respond to the realities of contemporary con-

legal treatment of enterprise liability was necessary and that no such law existed in Cambodia. Thus,
the PTC concluded that JCE-1 was not foreseeable to the Khmer Rouge defendants as of 19751979. See ECCC PTC decision, supra, at 9179-87.
.25. Prosecutor v. Orid, IT-03-68-A, Judgment (July 3, 2008). For a criticism of the decision,
see Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-in-Review, 7 Nw. J. INT'L Hum. RTs.
170, 225-29 (2009).
26. Prosecutor v. Ori6, IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 311 (June 30, 2006). Judges have looked to
the defendant's authority to issue orders, the propensity of subordinates to follow those orders, and
the superior's general influence over subordinates and ability to punish those who disobey orders.
E.g., id. at 312; see also RATNER ET AL., supra note 19, at 147.
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flict-involving transnational networks and nonstate actors-and is "defeated by the absence of thorough subordination" (p. 45).
To rejuvenate the doctrine, Osiel recommends infusing it with Claus
Roxin's theory of organizational domination. Roxin argues that bureaucratic
leaders commit offenses when they transmit illicit orders, even if they do not
know who will commit the offense or in what manner.2 Subordinates are
fungible, "mere gear[s] in a giant machine."2 A leader is like an evil
"watchmaker" who attaches a clock to a bomb, winds it up, and walks away,
knowing with reasonable certainty that the device will detonate (p. 105).
Osiel contends that in such circumstances, managerial control of an organization should satisfy the requirement of effective control for the purposes of
superior responsibility.29 Thus, he suggests focusing on organizational structures to capture leaders' misconduct rather than divining shared criminal
purpose, as JCE demands (pp. 106-07).
Roxin's model of managerial control will not solve all of the evidentiary
lacunae. It applies well to certain hierarchical organizations-the same
types of collectives that are most susceptible to superior responsibility doctrine as it now stands. Determining the extent and duration of a defendant's
managerial control is much more difficult when de jure and de facto authorities diverge and unofficial and nonstate actors enter the fray.
2. Lowering the Barfor Criminal Intent

Another way to widen the scope of superior responsibility would be to
relax the standard for mens rea. The ICTY and ICTR have steered away
from a negligence standard, which would render a defendant liable when he
should have known about crimes but failed to keep a watchful eye on subordinates.o Instead, they have insisted on a tougher constructive knowledge
standard, requiring that the defendant received information putting him on
notice of possible abuses, but failed to investigate them."

27. CLAUS RoxIN, AUTORiA Y DOMNIUO DEL HECHO EN DERECHO PENAL § 24, at 270 (Joaquin Cuello Contreras & Jos6 Luis Serrano Gonzdlez de Murillo trans., 6th ed. 1998).
28.

Claus Roxin, Problemas de Autorta y Participacidnen la CriminalidadOrganizada, in
194 (Juan Carlos Ferr6 & Enrique Anarte Borrallo, eds., 1999).

DELENCUENCIA ORGANIZADA

29. He also views managerial control as grounds for convicting the leader as a co-perpetrator
or indirect perpetrator, but as noted above, early ICC jurisprudence suggests that would require
proving that the superior's contribution was essential to the crime. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. Other courts have also generally disfavored negligence standards, which risk casting the
net of culpability too widely. A U.S. tribunal controversially applied such a standard in the 1945
Yamashita case, holding a Japanese general liable for failing to attempt to discover and control
widespread crimes by his subordinates. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Military Commission, Manila, Philippines, Oct. 8-Dec. 7, 1945, 4 UNWCC, Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 1, 35, aff 'd In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
31. E.g., Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment, il[ 35-37, 42 (July 3, 2002)
(requiring a showing that "the accused [superior] either 'knew' or 'had reason to know"' of crimes
committed by subordinates over whom he had effective control); Prosecutor v. Delalid, IT-96-21-A,
Judgment, [226, 241 (Feb. 20, 2001) (interpreting "'had reason to know"' such that "a superior
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The Rome Statute of the ICC imposes a similar standard on civilians,
who can only be held responsible if they "knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated" that abuses were taking place.3 2 It
treats military commanders differently, rendering them liable if they "knew
or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" about offenses." This is essentially a negligence standard. If interpreted loosely, it
could veer toward strict liability for leaders deemed to have "effective control."" Osiel does not advocate strict criminal liability, but importing
Roxin's model of managerial control does relieve pressure on prosecutors to
establish the defendant's constructive knowledge. If organizational leaders
can be reasonably sure that crimes will be committed pursuant to their nefarious plans, they are on notice of likely offenses from the moment of the
plan's inception. "[T]he watchmaker knows that, in the ordinary course of
events, his device will explode" (p. 108).
Osiel's doctrinal proposals are grounded in a realistic vision of how
some collective crimes doubtlessly transpire, and their appeal to prosecutors
is clear. By focusing on organizational control, they evade some of the evidentiary challenges of proving specific superior-subordinate relationships
and the defendant's "reason to know" of offenses. However, if broadly construed, they can easily run afoul of the culpability principle. In addition to
the challenge of discerning the scope of a defendant's control, evidence of
the specific contours of organizations' criminal plans is apt to be sparse.
Osiel is aware of the hazard of expanding doctrines to compensate for
evidentiary challenges but "pleads guilty, unabashedly" (p. 127) and offers a
spirited defense. He contends that some "normative harshness" is warranted
in dealing with "colossal wrongs."" He argues that legal principles such as
nullum crimen sine lege and the lenity rule must be weighed in relation to
the law's broader normative aims. He advocates a "character conception of
individual culpability" (p. 131) that looks not only to the letter of the law
but also to widely shared norms in assessing culpability. He is comfortable
leaving blurry edges on the forms of responsibility that apply to high-level
officials, who do not need to be told that mass abuses are unlawful and can
exploit bright-line rules to evade responsibility.3 He argues, "[W]hen a person who, presented with clear options of white and black, chooses to enter
will be criminally responsible through the principles of superior responsibility only if information
was available to him which would have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates").
32.

Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 28(b)(i).

33.

Id. art. 28(a)(i).

34. The outcome will likely hinge on how the ICC interprets the language "the circumstances at the time." See RATNER ET AL., supra note 19, at 148.
35. P. 129. Osiel borrows the phrase "normative harshness" from Darryl Robinson, who has
used the term to criticize proposals such as Osiel's for deviating from liberal principles. See Darryl
Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 925, 944
(2008).
36. On the issue of notice, see Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: JudicialLawmaking at
the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 124, 158-71 (2008) (arguing that perpetrators
of mass atrocities were on "sufficient notice of the foreseeability of ICL jurisprudential innovations"
based on extant law and widely held universal norms).
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so ominous a grey zone between the two, the law rightly deems him to act at
his peril" (p. 140). This resembles the justification for JCE-III, but as noted
above, Osiel contends that an expanded version of superior responsibility
offers a safer and more accurate way to approach collective crimes.
A tug-of-war exists between liberal legal norms designed to protect defendants' rights (such as mens rea) and those designed to combat gross
human rights violations. If ICL strays too far from basic individual rights, it
loses credibility; if it fails to fight impunity, it loses relevance. The key is to
strike the optimal dynamic balance. Osiel's doctrinal reforms are carefully
crafted efforts to do so. To this reviewer, his importation of Roxin's theory is
sensible, but only if it is narrowly construed. Courts should require clear
evidence of control and specific plans to commit particular types of offenses
to hold defendants liable as "watchmakers."" Otherwise, Osiel's model
could easily suffer from excess elasticity, as enterprise liability does.
III. RECONCILING

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES

Reforming ICL doctrines can help make criminal trials more effective,
but it does not resolve the question of who should stand trial in the wake of
collective atrocities. Osiel examines differences in the approaches national
and international authorities tend to take toward amnesty and prosecution
and advocates prioritizing pragmatic, context-specific solutions.
A. Deciding Whom to Prosecute

Osiel argues that national and international prosecutors tend to have different priorities. Domestic prosecutors generally apply narrow doctrines,
seek to pin responsibility on the "kingpins [of] mass atrocity," and downplay
the collective nature of the crimes (pp. 147-48). This pleases their "executive masters," who seek above all to draw a line under the old regime, quell
public passions, and establish "a new founding myth for the nation" (p.
155). Osiel believes this "scapegoating of sorts" can be justified as part of
the "costs of reconciliation and relegitimation," insofar as prosecutors select
defendants according to degrees of wrongdoing and set aside more "invidious considerations" (p. 152).
International prosecutors generally prefer to cast wider nets and apply
more expansive doctrines like JCE, Osiel contends. This reflects their strong
normative commitment to human rights as the "bearers and exegetes of this
ascendant faith" (p. 184) and a prevailing view that serious suspected offenders should stand trial. It also results from concrete career incentives to

37. As Osiel notes, the ICC has issued some jurisprudence broadly in line with this reasoning. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, [500-38 (Sept. 30, 2008) (laying out criteria under which a defendant can be convicted as
a perpetrator based on organizational membership). Osiel suggests that if prosecutors establish that
the defendant assumed effective control of a dangerous organization, the evidentiary burden could
shift, requiring the defendant to show a loss of control before a subsequent crime was committed.
P. 107. To this reviewer, that would be too perilous a step away from the presumption of innocence.
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notch convictions on their belts. Osiel argues that international prosecutors
generally prioritize retribution and deterrence "with reconciliation a distant
third" (p. 170). Targeting lower-level suspects alongside chieftains is appealing, both because they are often easier to convict and because it is their
faces that are most often seared in the memories of the ordinary victims who
seek justice (pp. 165-66).
National and international priorities sometimes do diverge. Many transitional governments have downplayed accountability, and others have
preferred limited, quick trials to decapitate the ancien rigime and consolidate peace on desired terms. Examples include the 1979 People's
Revolutionary Tribunal in Cambodia, which convicted Pol Pot and leng
Sary for genocide in absentia, and the trial of Francisco Macfas Nguema and
nine of his henchmen in Equatorial Guinea the same year. At the hybrid tribunal now operating in Cambodia, national and international co-prosecutors
have wrangled over how many Khmer Rouge suspects should face justice.
Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly insists that trying more than the five people now in custody would endanger national stability.
There are also important counterexamples, however, in which states
have gone beyond trying a handful of big fish. In Greece, nearly 90 military
junta members stood trial for abuses of the 1967-74 period. Hundreds of
former communist officials in East Germany, thousands of Ethiopians associated with the Mengitsu Haile-Mariam regime, and tens of thousands of
Rwandans implicated in the 1994 killings have been subjected to various
types of domestic criminal proceedings. The Argentinian governmentwhich halted prosecutions and enacted amnesties and pardons after the 1985
"Trial of the Juntas" for fear of military revolt-invalidated the amnesty law
in 2005 and is now trying hundreds of "Dirty War" suspects. The Iraqi Special Tribunal established to adjudicate crimes of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist
regime has tried roughly 2 dozen people and remains active. Viewed in this
context, the number of indictments issued by the ICTY (161), ICTR (92),
ICC (14 to date), and U.N.-backed hybrid court for Sierra Leone (13) look
much less exceptional."
When international and domestic priorities do conflict, how can they be
reconciled? Osiel argues that it is "undesirable, or at least premature" to try
to synchronize national and international prosecutorial practices (p. 179).
Doctrinally, he sees value in national experimentation and warns that ICL
should not "encroach too ambitiously on the legitimate preserves of national
law, at least in democratic societies" (p. 176). With respect to personal jurisdiction, he defends the prerogative of democratic leaders to "privilege
reconciliation over retribution in their policies of transitional justice" and
"prosecute only the very worst offenders" when broader trials would un38. ICTR, Report on the completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, at 4 n.7, U.N. Doc. S/2010/259 (May 25, 2010); Key Figures of ICTY Cases, ICFY,
http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last visited October 5, 2010). The prosecutor for Sierra Leone notably
declined to exercise jurisdiction over suspects under the age of eighteen. E.g., David M. Crane,
Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: the West African Experience, Hum. RTs. BRIEF,
Spring/Summer 2008, at 11, 14-15.
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dermine stability (p. 179). International courts may "step back into the
breach" when national prosecutors fall far short of accountability norms but
should be "more attentive to national preoccupations." 9 Overall, he prioritizes flexibility and finding a "practicable middle ground" that balances
aims of deterrence, retribution, and reconciliation on a context-specific basis
(p. 180).
Policymakers indeed face balancing acts in coping with collective
crimes. The apparent trend in ICL is toward a norm requiring states to prosecute those deemed "most responsible" for atrocities, but to leave greater
sovereign discretion with respect to lower-level subordinates. One argument
for focusing on leaders is that prosecuting lower-level subordinates delivers
diminishing marginal benefits of retribution, deterrence, and norm penetration, but still carries significant risks to reconciliation.4 This claim has
intuitive appeal, but strong counterarguments exist. Trying underlings may
better advance retribution-because they are the physical abusers that victims saw in the flesh-and have more deterrent impact-because foot
soldiers are less likely to risk prosecution than senior officials who commit
abuses in the pursuit of much greater wealth and spoils. There is little evidence that trials have prompted relapses to violence that would not
otherwise have occurred, and in certain circumstances, broader prosecutions
may also facilitate reconciliation by preempting vigilante justice.
It is exceedingly difficult to test these propositions empirically, which
helps explain why debates over transitional justice approaches have been so
resistant to resolution. The risks and rewards of various prosecutorial strategies vary from case to case, and officials make policy judgments based on
highly imperfect information. Some degree of selectivity in prosecution is
usually imperative due to practical constraints.41 Even if time and money
were no obstacles, the wisdom of trying all possible suspects is doubtful in a
transitional society. How defendants are chosen is thus crucial to the legitimacy of the accountability process. When prosecutors choose fairly, trials
can provide a sense of justice and contribute to a better shared understanding of the abuses of the past. Conversely, when prosecutors choose culprits
to advance narrow political or ethnic vendettas, trials can degenerate into
charades of victors' justice and reinforce social divides. The danger of selective (in)justice is a perennial and legitimate concern in criminal trials
39. P. 180. The Rome Statute does allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction when the relevant
state or states are "unwilling or unable" to proceed. Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 12-15, 17.
This is the "complementarity" principle. Osiel rightly argues that the ICC should exercise careful
review so domestic prosecutors do not simply "dump" inconvenient or unpopular cases at its door. P.
182.
40. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in
Strategies of InternationalJustice, INT'L SEc., Winter 2003/2004, at 5, 20-24 (reviewing a number
of brief case studies from the post-Cold War era). The ICTY has drawn particular criticism as a
costly venture that indulged Western interests at the apparent expense of interethnic healing. See,
e.g., Cobban, supra note 4.
41.
The Rwandan case illustrates some of the practical limitations of a society that seeks
credible justice for thousands of suspected offenders. See Christopher J. Le Mon, Rwanda's Troubled Gacaca Courts, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2007, at 16, 17.
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following mass abuses. 42 Timing also matters; prosecutions conducted before the dust settles pose special challenges to stability, whereas delaying
trials too long can forfeit much of their impact. 43
International courts and lawyers have vital roles in helping to arrive at
the best possible solutions in particular contexts. They can provide important checks and balances on state action by reviewing how national
prosecutions are designed and conducted. They can also furnish essential
technical support that makes trials more legitimate and effective." When
states refuse to act in accordance with widely shared norms, international
lawyers should apply pressure. Too often, gross human rights violators enjoy impunity in the name of reconciliation as rival elites patch fences and
continue to misgovern. In certain circumstances, the ICC should exercise
jurisdiction where domestic leaders face legitimate domestic political constraints or refuse to hold the worst offenders accountable.
International pressure is not always unwelcome; it often provides political cover for domestic policymakers who seek accountability. Nevertheless,
Osiel provides an important reminder of the need for sensitivity to local
conditions. International criminal lawyers are right to push for accountability norms. To build a normative regime that remains credible over the
medium term, they need to do so responsibly.
B. Using Amnesty as a Carrot

Prosecution is not the only policy option available in the wake of mass
atrocities. Amnesty, with or without associated truth commissions, is also a
path commonly taken. Osiel laments what he regards as a "near-complete
monopolization" (p. 235) of the ICL literature by those favoring prosecution. He argues that amnesty agreements are useful, lawful arrows in the
quiver of policy options available to societies emerging from mass atrocities. He sees prosecution less as a "normative duty as such" and more of a
"bargaining chip" in negotiations to reconstitute a broken state (p. 235).
Amnesty is the "carrot," and prosecution the "stick" (pp. 221-22). Pragmatic amnesty deals "can facilitate democratic transition and help end civil
41
wars" by incentivizing abusers to lay down their arms or part with power.
When these and other dividends are likely to outweigh the costs in foregone

42. This is perhaps the most common normative critique of ICL as an enterprise. See, e.g.,
Charles T. Call, Is TransitionalJustice Really Just?, BROWN J. WORLD Anw., Fall 2004, at 101, 10708.
43. See Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Context, Timing and the Dynamics of TransitionalJustice: A
HistoricalPerspective, 31 HuM. RTs. Q. 163, 218-19 (2009).
44. This is one of the principal justifications for the establishment of U.N.-backed tribunals
in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Lebanon. See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 295, 301-04 (2003).
45. P. 221. For an argument that strategic amnesty pacts tend to achieve more desirable outcomes than criminal prosecutions, see Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 40, at 17-44 (reviewing a
number of brief case studies from the post-Cold War era).
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justice, Osiel contends that governments will-and should---consider amnesty seriously.
Human rights advocates generally frown on deals that exempt gross human rights violators from accountability, but Osiel rejects the notion that
amnesties are presumptively disfavored under international law. He fears
that human rights lawyers and advocates have succumbed to "constructivism
run amok" (p. 235), hoping that their ambitious interpretations of the duty to
prosecute will become self-fulfilling prophecies. He asserts that amnesty
"largely defines state practice-massively and pervasively, throughout the
world" despite the fact that international lawyers "prefer to lavish scholarly
attention on emergent tendencies to the contrary" (p. 233).
Amnesties are common indeed, especially since the mid-1990s.4 More
than seventy amnesty programs have been introduced in the past decade
47
alone, often coupled with truth commissions or selected trials. At least one
amnesty program-adopted in South Africa alongside the Truth and Reconciliation Commission-has won considerable praise from human rights
advocates. 48 It is therefore safe to conclude that customary international law
does not impose a general duty to prosecute after periods of mass abuse. To
the extent that a customary norm is emerging, it can be more fairly described as a requirement to prosecute the most serious offenders absent
compelling domestic circumstances.49
Many governments continue to regard amnesty deals as viable policy
options, and international law is unlikely to eradicate the practice in the near
term. Amnesty is not always the wrong policy choice. Dealing with perpetrators of mass crimes almost always looks simpler on paper than it does in
the messy throes of a transitional environment. Policymakers must consider
a range of objectives and weigh the powerful interest of justice against lives
that could be saved if amnesty entices combatants to lay down their weapons and rejoin the fold. As Mark Freeman argues, amnesty deals are
sometimes "necessary evils.",o
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for international lawyers to lean
against the practice and subject amnesty deals to scrutiny. The interests of
governing elites who undertake cost-benefit calculations and make amnesty
decisions often diverge from those of their citizens and the international
46. LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 18-22
(2008); Louise Mallinder, Can Amnesties and International Justice be Reconciled?, 1 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 208, 209-10 (2007) [hereinafter Mallinder, Reconciled?].
47.
Amnesty Law Database, http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/
(last
InstituteofCriminologyandCriminalJustice/ResearchlBeyondLegalism/AmnestyLawDatabase
visited Oct. 3, 2010).

48. See, e.g., Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 647, 648-51 (1999) (defending the amnesty
component as a necessary measure bearing appropriate conditions).

49.
213-14.

RATNER ET AL., supra note 19, at 170-71; Mallinder, Reconciled?, supra note 46, at

50. See MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
(2009); see also Max Pensky, Amnesty on trial: impunity, accountability,and the norms of international law, 1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 1, 18 (2008).
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community. Sweeping certain past abuses under the rug is sometimes a "necessary evil" to pursue peace and reconciliation, but it can also serve as a
cynical tool to bury inconvenient facts and solidify elites' positions of power.5 1 Too many such deals will leave international accountability norms in
tatters, especially if they include those deemed most responsible for atrocities. If amnesty becomes an expected feature of peace accords, combatants
may conclude that they have little to fear (and perhaps legal concessions to
gain) from committing crimes.52
It may be unrealistic to expect transitional leaders to take global norms
seriously when their near-term domestic incentives point in the opposite
direction. That is why international law should require them to do so and
why state practice alone should not determine the legality of amnesties. Letting mass criminals off the hook should not be a step lightly taken. Scholars
have proposed a variety of standards to impose, including democratic approval, an exhaustion of other reasonable options, minimum leniency, and
strict conditions. 53 These features can make amnesties more legally acceptable and more effective in promoting aims such as truth-telling and
reconciliation.
The Rome Statute is notably silent on the question of amnesty, but one
obvious possibility is for that court to review proposed national amnesty
deals in determining whether and under what conditions to honor them. An
ICC review process could strengthen a government's bargaining hand by
signaling to the counterparty that international amnesty is in the offing if
high standards are met. Those deemed most responsible for mass atrocities
should be deemed ineligible absent truly exceptional and compelling circumstances.
IV. IMPOSING COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS

Regardless of the balance they strike between amnesty and prosecution,
societies emerging from mass atrocity invariably face dilemmas on how to
address the collective nature of offenses and the misdeeds of myriad functionaries and bystanders. Osiel offers a bold proposal: impose collective
financial sanctions on groups of military officers found responsible for
atrocities. Penalties would incentivize military officers to prevent abuse by
their peers or subordinates, which is appropriate because they are the "lowest cost providers of insurance against mass atrocity" (p. 196). Osiel
contends that strict pecuniary liability for officials in the responsible units
51. Ronald Slye refers to these as "amnesiac amnesties." Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of
Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?,43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 240-41 (2002).
52. Payam Akhavan argues that amnesty deals can also signal weakness and encourage insurgents to regroup and attack again. This occurred in Sierra Leone after the 1999 Lom6 Accords
granted amnesty to rebel leader Foday Sankoh, who subsequently tried to overthrow the government. Akhavan, Disincentive to Peace?, supra note 4, at 635-36.
53. FREEMAN, supra note 50, at 110-79; Mallinder, Reconciled?, supra note 46, at 226-27;
Slye, supra note 51, at 245-47.
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would have a deterrent "multiplier effect" and could even provide restitution
funds for victims (pp. 194-95).
Collective punishment should not be taken lightly-even if it amounts to
civil fines rather than incarceration-but Osiel's proposal is not quite as radical as it may first appear. Partnerships are held joint and severally liable for
certain offenses; individuals can secure damages from municipalities; the
International Court of Justice imposes collective civil liability on states; and
the U.N. Security Council implements collective economic sanctions.54 In
the fight against gross human rights violations, collective civil remedies can
be useful complements to individual criminal responsibility.5 Osiel's plan is
simply for more targeted civil sanctions.
The greater problems with the plan may lie in implementation. Financial
sanctions could conceivably deter crimes but would need to be quite costly
to outweigh the powerful organizational incentives that motivate soldiers to
commit atrocities during conflict. Just as many transitional governments shy
away from putting officers on trial, many would be loath to levy costly sanctions against them. This is especially true in states where militaries exert
heavy influence and where officers and troops are poorly paid but wellarmed-precisely the states where atrocities most often occur. International
pressure would likely be required, and enforcing sanctions on an unwilling
government would be difficult. Where militaries threaten to close ranks, host
states would generally prioritize reconciliation, and as Osiel emphasizes
elsewhere, their assessments deserve some credence.
Financial sanctions would acknowledge the reality of collective participation but would not necessarily leave victims with a more accurate picture
of how crimes transpired. If the prosecutorial narrative risks exaggerating
individual roles, a collective civil remedy risks suggesting undifferentiated
blame-at least within particular parts of the military. Civil penalties would
also lack the retributive punch and sense of moral condemnation associated
with trials. Any funds raised for victims would likely be modest; most mass
atrocities occur in poor countries, where military personnel have scant onthe-book salaries. Financial payouts to victims could even backfire if recipients see meager restitution as a dismissal of their suffering. The modest
benefits of collective sanctions have to be weighed against the cost of
breaching the norm disfavoring collective punishment.
Despite these problems, Osiel's proposal should not be dismissed out of
hand. An ambitious version of the scheme is unlikely to take hold soon, and
he sensibly focuses on how the concept could develop incrementally in democratic states. A narrowly tailored scheme may well be worth testing and
expanding if it proves successful. In a field as challenging and important as
ICL, some experimentation is warranted.
54. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345 (2003); Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2336, 2344-45 (2005).
55. In the Bosnia Genocide Case, the ICJ considered awarding reparations to Bosnia from
Serbia in connection with the Srebrenica massacre but opted not to do so. See Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 163-67 (Feb. 26).
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CONCLUSION

Neither lawyers nor policymakers have arrived at anything approaching
a silver-bullet solution to the challenge of accounting for mass atrocities.
ICL has developed considerably since the era of Nuremberg but still faces
challenges in dealing with collective criminality. There is a natural tendency
to stretch doctrines to hold high-level actors accountable, but that path is
fraught with danger. Laws influence social behavior largely because they
resonate with common conceptions of right and wrong. Osiel offers thoughtful suggestions to help lawyers and policymakers address impunity and
prevent future abuses without straying too far from the law's liberal moorings.
He also contributes by highlighting the importance of incentives and the
need for pragmatic tactics in the promotion of categorical imperatives. He
does not endeavor to settle debates as much as steer them in positive directions, considering the tools available and the various trade-offs they entail.
Many of his points are provocative and invite the reader to engage with
him-as this Review has tried to convey-but disagreement is a healthy
feature of societal responses to complex atrocities. A measure of dynamic
tension generates creativity and provides the flexibility and shock absorption that are lacking in a more rigid, one-size-fits-all approach. Anyone
interested in these debates will find Making Sense of Mass Atrocity a book

well worth reading.

